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ABSTRACT

Medication errors in anesthesia are prevalent and efforts to address medication
errors bring with them new potential avenues of failure, especially when the work system
and ‘work as done’ are not considered in the design of the intervention. I employed two
methodologies in interviews of anesthesia providers to help further understand the
context of anesthesia ‘work as done’ to inform the design of future medication errorreducing interventions. Results of the first interview methodology, the critical decision
method, revealed a diverse array of challenging scenarios in which ‘work as done’ often
deviates from ‘work as imagined.’ Results of the second interview methodology,
vignette-based interviews, revealed how the decision-making processes of anesthesia
providers may vary even when managing an identical case. These interviews provide
context to the otherwise nebulous ‘variability’ of anesthesia provider ‘work as done.’
This context highlights the potential unforeseen dangers that may occur with the addition
of future interventions and suggests avenues in which future interventions may fit better
into the workflow of the anesthesia provider with design considerations. Future design
efforts should focus on supporting the resilience of anesthesia providers: the information
seeking and problem anticipation which are used to safely manage the uncertainty and
complexity of their work. Future work should assess how ‘work as done’ may vary in
different hospitals, and additionally focus on how ‘work as done’ influences the process
of medication administration.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

Anesthesiology and its practitioners are responsible for numerous aspects of
patient care, including: prevention and relief of pain before, during, and after procedures;
the evaluation and maintenance of normal physiological function; and, above all else,
assuring the safety of the patient (Miller & Pardo, 2011). Given the complex and
individualized nature of anesthesiology care, the occurrence of errors is all but inevitable.
This inevitability has led to a partnership between anesthesia providers and industrial and
systems engineers, all sharing the common goal of increasing the safety of the anesthesia
system. Engineers have been researching the identification and reduction of anesthesia
medication errors since the early 1980s. Craig and Wilson (1981) originally examined a
broad scope of problems, referring to these incidents as “anaesthetic misadventures” and
found that human error was most frequently a contributing factor. There have been many
studies examining a range of anesthesia errors using a varying vocabulary: intraoperative
problems (Fasting & Gisvold, 2000), anesthetic incidents (James, 2003), severe critical
events (Engelhardt et al., 2019), medication errors (Glavin, 2010), and adverse drug
events (Wittich, Burkle, & Lanier, 2014). Regardless of their nomenclature, one fact
remains clear in the plethora of research: medication errors and error-related scenarios are
still a problem today, just as they were a problem 40 years ago. Current estimates on the
prevalence of medication errors range from 1 in 450 medication administrations
(Yamamoto, Ishikawa, & Makita, 2008) to as many as 1 in 20 medication administrations
(Nanji, Patel, Shaikh, Seger, & Bates, 2016). This alarmingly high statistic is perhaps
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offset by the fact that the majority of medication errors that are reported lead to little or
no harm, though the potentiality of harm due to medication errors is unceasing and can be
lethal (Ajmal, 2011). Examples of common medication errors include wrong dose, wrong
drug (often due to accidental substitution via syringe swap), omission (missed dose), and
repetition (extra dose) (Webster, Merry, Larsson, McGrath, & Weller, 2001). Research
suggests that these errors result from a variety of causes including: (i) organizational
barriers, such as anesthesia providers working alone; (ii) cultural barriers, such as
demotivating incident reporting systems (Eichhorn, 2010), and (iii) physical barriers,
such as look-alike drugs (i.e., different drugs stored in similar ampoules or vials), soundalike drugs (e.g., oxycodone and oxycontin), and abrupt changes in drug concentration
from suppliers (Ismail & Taqi, 2013).
Efforts to Reduce Medication Errors in Anesthesia
Given the research focused on identifying and addressing medication errors in
anesthesia, it remains surprisingly unclear why little has actually been done that improves
this system (Grigg & Roesler, 2018). Concurrent expert commentary has resulted in
numerous recommendations regarding how to reduce the prevalence and danger of
medication errors and error-related events in anesthesia. Of 35 different
recommendations found, the three most academically supported are: have an incident or
error reporting system; label every medication with drug name, date, and concentration;
and read and verify every vial, ampoule, and syringe label before administration (Wahr et
al., 2017). Wahr et al. (2017) applied a framework developed by Kitson, Harvey, and
McCormack (1998) to suggest three pillars that prevent the implementation and
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adherence of expert recommendations: (i) a lack of proper research on intraoperative
medication strategies; (ii) a lack of literature on how safety culture impacts
implementation of medication strategies; and (iii) a lack of supporting tools necessary to
motivate a drive for change.
Further investigation into research efforts proposing and assessing interventions
to reduce medication errors reveals why these efforts have not led to substantial change:
they lack proper consideration of the actual ‘work as done’ healthcare system. In practice,
the myopic application of these interventions results in a lack of compliance, which can
lead to greater danger. For example, Merry et al. (2011) performed one of the few
randomized controlled trials assessing SAFERSleep, a multimodal system which
incorporated many suggested improvements including: customized drug trays and drug
trolley doors, pre-filled syringes, large legible color-coded labels, a barcode reader to
provide verification of selected drugs immediately before administration, automatic
compilation of an anesthetic record, and a warning system if an antibiotic has not been
administered within 15 minutes of the start of anesthesia. The SAFERSleep system
resulted in a significantly lower overall mean rate of drug errors (9.1% vs 11.6%),
however most of these were drug recording errors, not drug administration errors (which
are the direct source of danger). Drug administration errors alone were not significantly
reduced. This may be due to a lack of compliance (i.e., anesthesia providers not using the
SAFERSleep system despite its availability). Although compliance was found to be
negatively correlated with error rate, anesthetists were fully compliant with all principles
of the SAFERSleep system in only 18% of cases. It has been argued that a user’s lack of
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compliance with a system is not necessarily a reflection of the user, but instead a
reflection of poor design of the system. Efforts to mandate compliance in these
interventions (e.g., a mandatory bar code scanner developed by Khan et al. (2016) in
which the drugs can only be administered after being scanned) may seem like a viable
solution in theory; however, experts warn that such interventions could be dangerous to
implement in practice. In a reply to Khan et al. (2016), Webster and Merry (2017) argue
that implementing new technologies can introduce new potential modes of failure (e.g.,
software bugs, battery failure) and that so called “forcing functions” can often result in
workarounds which can increase the risk of harm to patients.
In addition to the new failure modes inherent in new technologies, the reduced
risk of error that they provide may only exist within a particular frame of reference in the
anesthesia delivery process. An example of such a technology is prefilled syringes.
Traditionally, anesthesia providers must self-fill syringes – they take an empty syringe,
fill it using an ampoule containing the desired drug, and then label the syringe. Errors in
the use of self-filled syringes include drawing up the wrong drug (potentially due to lookalike and sound-alike drugs), or drawing incorrect amounts or concentrations of a drug
(potentially due to abrupt changes in drug concentration from suppliers) (Ismail & Taqi,
2013). Prefilled syringes are already filled and labelled, theoretically simplifying the
medication delivery process and reducing the risk of error. In reality, this risk may
instead be transferred either upstream or downstream in the totality of the anesthesia
delivery process. While prefilled syringes may reduce the cognitive workload of
anesthesia providers during medication preparation and administration, and additionally
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reduce the number of potential system vulnerabilities compared with self-filled syringes,
new risks arise and old risks still exist in prefilled syringes (Yang, Rivera, Fortier, &
Abernathy, 2016). Prefilled syringes are still susceptible to errors resulting from lookalike labels, sound-alike names, and abrupt concentration changes similar to the
ampoules used for self-filled syringes (Gage Parr, 2019). Additionally, there are
additional tasks associated with prefilled syringes that need to be accounted for in the
work system (e.g., the expiration date must be checked more frequently than
conventional ampoules and there is additional packaging that must be unwrapped for
each syringe). While the benefits of prefilled syringes might outweigh the potential
additional risks, overlooking the new modes of failure they introduce may increase their
risk of harm until the system adapts to the change.
Technology design in healthcare systems should consider the inherent interactions
with the organizations, tasks, and persons of the environment, as well as the subsequent
processes and outcomes that result (Holden et al., 2013). In working towards designing
better systems we must better understand the user and how they interact with the system.
In the scope of anesthesia, the users are anesthesia providers: attending anesthesiologists,
resident anesthesiologists, and certified registered nurse anesthetists (CRNAs).
Interventions to reduce medication errors must be designed with an understanding of
what decisions anesthesia providers need to make, the information used to make those
decisions, and how those decisions are made. By examining what we know about
decision making in anesthesia, we may be able to illuminate how new potential
interventions will interact with and fit within the anesthesia process.
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Decision Making in Anesthesia
Anesthesia is complex and requires numerous types of decisions to be made to
ensure patient safety (Manser & Wehner, 2002). The complex environment anesthesia
providers work in requires them to make decisions in the face of time constraints and
unexpected changes, making their decision-making likely naturalistic (Phipps & Parker,
2014) and generally in line with the Recognition-Primed Decision (RPD) model
(Raphaela Schnittker, Marshall, Horberry, Young, & Lintern, 2017). The RPD model
asserts that, when faced with time-pressure and unclear situations, experts do not employ
prescriptive decision-making strategies consisting of concurrent consideration of several
options in search for an optimal course of action (Klein, 1993). Instead, they take a more
linear approach, using their experience to mentally simulate a single course of action,
generated from their recognition and subsequent assessment of the situation. This single
course of action, if determined to work via mental simulation, will be implemented prior
to considering other options, and will continue to be implemented until new information
results in a reassessment of the situation.
Efforts to understand how anesthesia providers employ this naturalistic decisionmaking (NDM) process have been undertaken all over the world. Cuvelier and Falzon
(2011) conducted interviews in a pediatric anesthesiology service in a French hospital in
an effort to describe the variability anesthesiologists deal with and the strategies used to
avoid the negative consequences of this variability. They theorized that the performance
of an anesthesiologist relies on their ability to define an “envelope of potential
variability,” a list of various events which are anticipated despite not yet occurring, and
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for which a protocol can easily be applied. Within this envelope of potential variability
are events that are often known complications for which an anesthesiologist has been
taught to prepare for, such as facing a difficult airway. Danger occurs when
circumstances breach this envelope and the situation that the anesthesiologist is facing
was not envisaged prior to its occurrence. These events are often exceptionally rare or
extremely complex, where no clear course of action is understood to improve the
situation (Cuvelier & Falzon, 2011). Whether an event falls within the envelope of
potential variability (and can subsequently be adapted to) depends on both the uncertainty
of the event and the anesthesia providers’ anticipation skill. Skilled anesthesia providers
operate with a broader envelope of potential variability, and therefore are better at
adapting to more uncertain events. Cuvelier and Falzon (2011) suggest that resilience can
be enhanced by either (i) increasing the knowledge of rare events, making an event more
knowable; (ii) increasing an anesthesia provider’s ability to project themselves into future
real conditions, increasing their anticipation skill; or (iii) increasing an anesthesia
provider’s ability to diagnose that a situation has left the envelope of potential variability,
to mobilize additional resources. In the context of medication errors and interventions to
reduce them, novel interventions may create new events that breach the envelope of
potential variability, in effect creating new modes of failure.
Schnittker et al. (2017) conducted interviews in two public hospitals in Australia
to explore the cognitive processes of anesthesia providers specifically with respect to
airway management (a critical component of the anesthesia delivery process). They found
that the recognition-primed decision (RPD) model may be lacking in its ability to model
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airway management due to the teamwork component inherent to anesthesia resulting in
some decision making processes that are not entirely sequential (as described in the RPD
model) despite still using situation-action matching, suggesting that the RPD model be
adapted for this domain. In an additional analysis of their interviews, Schnittker et al.
(2018) identified enablers (factors that facilitated success) and barriers (factors that
impeded success) to successful airway management. In total, five factors were identified.
Three of the factors identified (equipment location and storage, teamwork and
communication, and experience and learning) were both enablers and barriers, indicating
that they may facilitate or impede success depending on the circumstance. The other two
factors (time and resource limitations, insufficient back up planning and equipment
preparation) were uniquely barriers, indicating that they only impede success. While
these interviews and the subsequent themes developed are specific to airway
management, they do help provide key information for how anesthesia providers make
decisions, and their conclusions should be considered when considering medication
errors and interventions.
Fioratou et al. (2016) performed interviews at four hospitals in Scotland to
explore the role of distributed situation awareness (DSA) on the anesthetic management
of challenging major obstetric hemorrhage cases. This work is unique in that it utilizes a
DSA framework instead of a naturalistic-decision making (NDM) framework for
exploring the decision-making process of anesthesia providers. However, situation
awareness and NDM are naturally linked; situation awareness serves as a major input in
the decision making process, and additionally may impact the types of processes used
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(Endsley, 1997). They found that anesthetists use varying sources of information such as
external artefacts (e.g., monitors, blood suction containers), and interactions with other
people (e.g., obstetricians, patients, other anesthetists) for perceiving, understanding, and
anticipating a situation in an operating room. Fioratou et al. (2016) highlight that
anesthetists do not use conventional models of situation awareness, where awareness
would reside solely in the head of the anesthetist, but rather a distributed understanding
of awareness emerges from anesthetist’s interactions with the system.
The prior research in anesthesia decision making mentioned above provide
helpful context for potential medication error intervention design. However, they all
studied different anesthesia systems and took different perspectives towards analyzing
their data. We cannot assume that the decision-making strategies made by anesthesia
providers in France, Australia, or Scotland represent the decision-making strategies of
anesthesia providers in the United States. According to the SEIPS 2.0 model, the
processes and outcomes in a work system result from an interaction between the
organization, tasks, persons, and environment (Holden et al., 2013). Physical and social
variations in anesthesia providers’ environments around the world will result in varied
decision-making processes. While prior research helps define a general scope of the
anesthesia decision-making processes, it is vital to understand how the health care
systems in the United States create a unique context for anesthesia providers.
‘Work as Imagined’ and ‘Work as Done’
Previous efforts to reduce medication errors have theorized success in a ‘work as
imagined’ system, where clinical decision making is a rigid process and safety naturally
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follows the adherence of standard procedures (Catchpole & Alfred, 2018). The utilization
and subsequent failures of this approach are apparent in Merry et al.’s (2011) study of the
SAFERSleep system. There was a significant reduction in drug administration errors
when, and only when, anesthesia providers were compliant with the prescriptive
standardized procedures for utilizing the system. The SAFERSleep system failed to
reduce drug administration errors not due to a technical failure, but rather a systematic
oversight; the requirement to adhere to a standardized, rigid, and inflexible process did
not fit into the work processes used by anesthesia providers, thus resulting in a lack of
compliance. This lack of compliance reflects the failures of the ‘work as imagined’
perspective. Anesthesia providers are not machines who keep patients safe by following a
specific procedure; the healthcare system is far too complex for simple application of
standard procedures to result in patient safety. Thus future efforts to reduce medication
errors must consider the true ‘work as done’ system, where decision making is
naturalistic and safety results from variability and adaptability (Smith & Plunkett, 2019).
In ‘work as done,’ anesthesia providers are only able to keep patients safe by continually
adapting and adjusting to the everchanging system in which they work. This aspect of
safety, the ability to succeed under both unexpected and expected conditions, has been
termed resilience (Hollnagel, 2014). In order to design around the ‘work as done’ system,
we must first further our understanding of it.
Prior research efforts, such as those discussed in the section above, have discussed
the concept (and importance of) anesthesia provider ‘work as done,’ where anesthesia
providers must cope with the variability and complexity of the healthcare domain. To
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help inform design efforts that may reduce anesthesia medication errors and improve and
maintain high quality of care, we need to provide further context to the otherwise
nebulous ‘variability’ and ‘complexity’ that anesthesia providers manage. What makes
the anesthesia work system complex? What decisions do anesthesia providers need to
make? How do they make those decisions? What resources do they use to make those
decisions? How does this all culminate in a resilient system? This thesis will describe
interviews conducted with anesthesia providers in order to illuminate their naturalistic
decision-making processes, furthering our understanding of the complexities in the ‘work
as done’ anesthesia system. By developing a better picture of anesthesia ‘work as done,’
we hope to provide helpful context with which to help inform interventions to reduce
anesthesia medication errors in the future.
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CHAPTER TWO
METHODS

There are various approaches one can take to elicit the naturalistic decision
making of an expert. To account for the wide range of plausible decisions that can be
made by anesthesia providers, we used two unique approaches: Critical Decision Method
(CDM) interviews, and vignettes-based interviews. By utilizing these two methods, we
hope to create an understanding of both the range of different decisions anesthesia
providers need to make, as well as the varying decision-making processes anesthesia
providers take when faced with the same challenge.
The Critical Decision Method
An approach commonly used to elicit the naturalistic decision-making process of
anesthesia providers is the Critical Decision Method (CDM) (Cuvelier & Falzon, 2011;
Fioratou et al., 2016; Raphaela Schnittker et al., 2017). The CDM is a cognitive task
analysis method focused on eliciting information pertinent to the naturalistic decisionmaking process described in the Recognition-Primed Decision (RPD) model (Klein,
1993; Klein, Calderwood, & Macgregor, 1989). To elicit the situational recognition key
to decision making prescribed in the RPD model, the CDM uses a retro-respective
interview strategy where an expert (in this case an anesthesia provider) describes a
challenging, nonroutine case from their past. Decision points of this case are identified
and then cognitively probed to reveal the cues, knowledge, goals, and other pieces of
information pertinent to assessing the described situation.
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While the CDM is a highly touted method for eliciting naturalistic decisionmaking processes, the complexity of anesthesia and the extreme variety of situations that
arise in its application makes it difficult to assess how different anesthesia providers may
vary in their decision-making processes. Different anesthesia providers may have
different approaches when confronted with the same problem; understanding these
different approaches is necessary to sufficiently account for the variability present in this
domain. In order to account for this variability, we used vignettes as an additional
interview component.
Vignettes
A vignette is a “brief, carefully written description of a person or situation
designed to simulate key features of a real world scenario” (Evans et al., 2015). These
simulated real-world scenarios are then presented to participants in order to elicit a
response that predicts or proxies their actual behavior given the circumstance of the
vignette. Vignette studies are structured similarly to other experimental designs,
consisting of varying independent variables that allow experimenters to assess their
impact on a dependent variable of interest (e.g., how a patient’s gender influences general
practitioners’ identification and management of depressive symptoms [Ross, Moffat,
McConnachie, Gordon, & Wilson, 1999]). To the author’s knowledge, vignettes have
never been used to assess decision-making in the anesthesia domain, though they do have
a history of being applied in healthcare, including understanding attitudes, perceptions,
and beliefs in nursing (Hughes & Huby, 2002), international and intranational variation in
quality of clinical care (Peabody & Liu, 2007), and conflicts of interest experienced by
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general practitioners in the course of child protection work (Wainwright, Gallagher,
Tompsett, & Atkins, 2010).
The vignette used in this thesis varies from conventional vignette studies as only
one identical vignette is used for every participant. Our goal in using a vignette-based
interview is to assess how anesthesia provider decision-making processes vary when
faced with the same scenario, thus no experimental manipulation of variables is
necessary. For assessing clinical practice, the advantages of vignette methodologies
include their cheap cost, ethical convenience, reliability, and validity (Peabody, Luck,
Glassman, Dresselhaus, & Lee, 2000). Criticisms of vignette methodologies include
uncertainty regarding their structural validity, whether they appropriately simulate a realworld scenario, and the subsequent external validity and generalizability of vignette
responses (Barter & Renold, 2000). While few studies have compared vignette responses
to actual responses, research suggests that clinical vignettes, if properly designed with
methodological care, do elicit externally valid and generalizable responses from
clinicians (Bachmann et al., 2008; Evans et al., 2015). A comprehensive examination of
the validity of vignettes methodologies for studying clinicians’ decision making has been
conducted by Evans et al. (2015).
Procedure
This work was done in conjunction with a larger project and was identified as a
research activity involving human subject that met exemption criteria under 45 CFR 46
and 21 CFR 56 by the Medical University of South Carolina Institutional Review Board.
Interviews were conducted at an academic hospital system in the southeastern United
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States. Both attending anesthesiologists and certified registered nurse anesthetists
(CRNAs) were interviewed in order to elicit information from the two types of anesthesia
providers. Interviews took place in conference rooms and offices in the different hospitals
within the large medical complex to reach anesthesia providers with varying
responsibilities and experiences. Participants were recruited via email and word of mouth
from the research team as well as other clinicians at the hospital (snowball sampling
[Noy, 2008]).
Developing the Interview
Each interview was split into two parts: (1) a modified CDM interview and (2) a
vignette-based interview. Part 1 employed an interview strategy adapted from the Critical
Decision Method (CDM) (Klein et al., 1989). We adapted the process to shorten the time
required and to focus on the most apparent decisions and actions the anesthesia provider
made in lieu of completing a comprehensive timeline of the whole surgical case. Part 2
utilized a vignette which presents the participating anesthesia provider with a
hypothetical case to manage. To elicit the decision-making processes of anesthesia
providers in a both a standard and challenging case, the vignette describes a scenario
where a case initially begins as expected, but a series of complications arise as it
proceeds. Initially, multiple vignettes were developed and presented to an
anesthesiologist on the research team. That anesthesiologist singled out one vignette and
refined its content and language to present a plausible and structurally sound scenario.
The structured interview strategy was piloted with two anesthesia providers in order to
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identify any issues with the strategy or wording. The script for the interviews, including
the vignette, is in the appendix.
Interview Process
Interviews started with part 1, the modified CDM interview. In part 1, the
participating anesthesia provider was asked to describe a case that they found particularly
challenging; a case where someone else might have made different decisions than they
did; or a case that they might wish to have made a different decision in hindsight.
Following the anesthesia provider’s telling of the case, a team of three researchers
identified and probed what appeared to be the predominant decision point in each case.
Upon completion of probing, the interview then moved on to part 2, the vignette-based
interview. In part 2, the participating anesthesia provider was asked to manage the case of
a 13-year-old boy’s laparoscopic appendectomy. Through a series of prompts, the
vignette presents a case increasing in complexity and becoming more atypical. Each
prompt revealed more information about the progress of the case, and after each prompt
the research team asked the participating anesthesia provider what they would do at the
current stage of the case. Probing questions followed the anesthesia provider’s response.
Analysis Plan
Interviews were transcribed using an automated transcription service and then
personally verified. Potential avenues for analyses of data retrieved using the CDM
include the structured approach and the emergent themes approach (Wong, 2004). The
structured approach uses an a priori framework of decision making in line with the
Recognition-Primed Decision (RPD) model, while the emergent themes approach is
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exploratory, using its own data to develop unanticipated concepts. As discussed above,
despite the fact that anesthesia provider’s decision making has been found to be
recognition-primed, the RPD model may be insufficient when applied to the domain of
anesthesia (Raphaela Schnittker et al., 2017), thus the emergent themes approach was the
analysis strategy used for this data. The emergent themes approach does not use an a
priori framework, instead, themes and their relationships are identified from the
transcripts themselves (Wong, 2004). Initially, broad patterns are identified from the
transcripts, which are then used to theorize new structures and themes. The transcripts are
then indexed and structured to explore each theme. Finally, the structured data is
synthesized to reveal meaningful conceptualizations.
Our probing questions asked in response to the vignette-based interview answers
were grounded in the same fundamental ideology as the probing questions asked in
response to the CDM interview answers: to elicit information pertinent to the decisionmaking process employed. Thus, we were able to analyze both part 1 and part 2 of the
interviews using a similar emergent themes approach. However, the vignette-based
interview responses provide us with the ability to more directly compare decision-making
strategies due to the consistency in the specific case and situation. Thus, we expected that
different themes will emerge in analysis of the vignette-based interview data.
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CHAPTER THREE
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION OF CDM INTERVIEWS

In total, 18 anesthesia providers were interviewed (8 CRNAs, 10 Attendings).
These 18 anesthesia providers will be referenced as P1-P18 throughout the rest of the
paper. Due to time constraints, four (P11, P12, P14, and P15) of the 18 anesthesia
providers were only able to participate in the vignette-based interview. In total, the
interviews took an average of 21.1 minutes (SD=7.2 mins). The modified CDM portion
of the interviews took an average of 10 minutes (SD=3.7 mins). The vignette portion of
the interviews took an average of 13.3 minutes (SD=2.7 mins).
As mentioned earlier, not all of the participants were able to participate in both
the modified CDM interview portion and the vignette-based interview portion due to
workload and schedules. Therefore, 14 anesthesia providers completed the modified
CDM interview portion (5 CRNAs, 9 Attendings). For each participant, aspects of what
made each case challenging and the themes relevant to medication error design
considerations were identified. A list of 14 potential emergent themes were first
developed, and then through discussion were revised and combined to generate a final list
of three emergent themes.
Analyzing the data revealed three overarching themes: (1) the cases which
anesthesia providers find to be challenging from a decision-making perspective are those
where the anesthesia provider has incomplete information which inhibits their ability to
confidently choose between differential diagnoses, (2) decision-making begins with
anesthesia providers seeking information from either the patient, technology, or
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colleagues, and (3) attributes such as personal experiences, special expertise, and working
domain influence how anesthesia providers perform information seeking tasks and
synthesize the information they provide. These themes and the context within this data
help create a more accurate view of ‘work as done’ and generate insights into what
potential medication error reducing interventions should look to avoid and what they
could possibly help facilitate.
Seeking Information from the Patient
The cases that anesthesia providers self-identified as challenging revolved around
confronting a lack of information. This lack of information manifested in many forms
throughout the anesthesia process. This lack of information can occur preoperatively,
intraoperatively, and postoperative, and for different reasons.
P5 and P18 both described a case where they had to seek out information
preoperatively in order to make a decision. P5 described a case where they had to provide
anesthesia for an obese patient (with a BMI>99) and had to decide between whether to do
a regional block or general anesthesia. P5 did not know whether the patient was going to
be able to lie flat for the entirety of the case, which is required for a regional block (P5’s
preferred anesthetic method for this patient). P18 described a case where they had to
provide anesthesia to a patient coming from an outside hospital which had not been able
to intubate the patient. P18 had to decide whether to do an awake fiberoptic intubation, a
mask ventilation, or a nasal fiberoptic intubation. P18’s patient had several prior surgeries
on the same anatomical structure and a limited paper chart that had “20% of the required
information that would have been helpful for [P18].” P5 was able to get an answer to
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their quandary by directly asking the patient how they slept at home and determined that
a regional block would be possible. P18 also questioned their patient but was not able to
get a direct answer to their question, instead having to build a collection of indirect
evidence:
“I asked [the patient] ‘Did you ever remember being awake while they did that
[procedure]?’ And [the patient] said, ‘no,’ [they] had no recollection of that. So that was
kind of indirect evidence for me that other people have not had to do an awake fiberoptic
intubation on [them]. So, I said, ‘okay, well, if that concept seems foreign to you, then
they didn't do that to you any other time.’ So, to me, that is indirect evidence that
someone else was able to bag mask ventilate [the patient] and I could feel comfortable
[with the case plan].”
In P5’s and P18’s cases, they were able to communicate with the patient directly
to get an answer. This, however, is not always the case. Verbal communication between
the anesthesia provider and the patient can be inhibited by language differences, as was
the case in P1’s patient who did not speak English and where the only translator they
could get was over the phone, and in other cases simply because young pediatric patients
may not yet have the ability to talk. Verbal communication is most often inhibited
between patient and anesthesia provider because the patient is under anesthesia. In these
cases, anesthesia providers still look to patients for answers, sometimes looking for blood
loss or listening for breath sounds. These patient scans can be difficult in the actual ‘work
as done’ world. P9 described having difficulties discerning the blood loss of a pediatric
patient:
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“[The patient] ended up losing a lot of blood and you couldn't really tell because
[of] where they were. They were on top of a warming blanket which kind of cocoons them
[…] and blood loss was around towels”.
P13 directly touched on the difficulties of listening to the patient:
“[In a training scenario] you'd be like ‘well I'd listen for breath sounds’… but in
real life, you listen for breath sounds and there's a lot going on in the OR, there's a lot of
ambient noise. You listen and you're like ‘sure sounds like we can hear breathe sounds
from both sides.’ So, the real-world context is often more difficult than the [training].”
Seeking Information from Technology
There were times when getting information from the patient alone was
insufficient, obliging anesthesia providers to use the technology around them to collect
more information. Anesthesia providers looked to monitors as an extension of the patient,
listening and observing in pursuit of the information they need. Challenging cases arose
from instances when monitors were not working, or the additional tests were not
providing the anesthesia providers with information informative to their differential.
P1’s case became exceedingly difficult after intubating when P1 discovered that
there was no end-tidal CO2 showing on the monitor. P1 began seeking potential
diagnoses by seeking information from the patient. This included looking for chest rise,
auscultating, and listening over the stomach. The information gained did not determine
the appropriate diagnosis, so P1 then called on technology to help provide clarity; a video
laryngoscope to check if the endotracheal tube was placed appropriately. This also did
not lead to a clear diagnosis. Eventually P1 had to resort to the diagnosis highest on their
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differential, which normalized the patient until extubation, at which point the patient was
again not providing the proper benchmarks to indicate it was safe to extubate. Although
the case ended safely, the stress of missing information still lingered:
“But still, in hindsight, I wonder, with that communication barrier and coming
from a different country and exposures over there, what did we miss?”
P16 described a case where everything went uneventfully throughout the surgery,
but the patient’s health suddenly started declining in the Post Anesthesia Care Unit
(PACU). The patient became hypotensive, so P16 went to their technological resources
for information. Initial blood gas tests showed nothing concerning, but the eventual chest
x-ray revealed a large tension capnothorax. P16 sought information from technology, and
while it did provide some information to help guide the differential, it was far from
giving them the solution they desired.
Seeking Information from Colleagues
When both technology and the patient were insufficient sources of information,
anesthesia providers turned to their colleagues. In every case there was some indication
that anesthesia providers sought information from surgeons, pharmacists, specialists,
and/or other anesthesia providers. In the midst of a challenging case, P16 not only
worked with the surgeon on the case but reached out to a colleague in the Intensive Care
Unit to assist in examining the patient as well.
Some cases were difficult not because of missing information from a patient, but
because of missing information from a surgeon, pharmacist, or other anesthesia provider.
P2 had a specific specialization making their approach towards a case “a little bit outside

22

the box.” In the case P2 described, the success of their unconventional approach relied
heavily on their ability to communicate with the anesthesia team:
“A lot of my decision making revolves [around] knowing the patient, talking to
the surgeon because I don't know what they're going to do exactly, it's not my field, and
then talking to anybody else involved on the team.”
In P8’s response, they chose not to talk about a specific case, instead detailing
many of the complications they find in robotic cases. Many of the complications that
arise in robotic cases need to be addressed through communication with colleagues.
Whether it be with other anesthesia providers:
“So part of the challenge is to get everybody on the same page of: ‘where should
these hemodynamics be running?’”
Or with surgeons:
[Regarding the positioning of the patient] “sometimes it comes down to talking
with the surgeons …we kind of try to do everything we can [..to…] be able to let them do
what they’re doing, and then some of the decision is finally to come back and say ‘look,
you know, I’ve tried everything I could possibly think of doing here, you need to kind of
work on your end a little bit to maybe give us a little bit of a break’”
What Informs Information Seeking and Synthesis
Across the interviews, often the example cases that the anesthesia providers
described were complex due to a lack of information or barriers in acquiring information.
This information was then sought out, usually utilizing a combination of the patient,
technology, or colleagues. The interview data suggests that both how anesthesia
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providers seek information and the decisions that anesthesia providers make once they
find information depends on their specialties, the domains that they work in, and their
personal experiences. P2’s approach to their cases, described earlier, highlight how, by
virtue of having a specialization, they have a different perspective than their colleagues:
“So the cardiac anesthesiologist and I were debating back and forth like what's really
better for the patient?” P6 discussed that their course of action was also likely different
than what others would have chosen, not because of any specialization but because of
their personal experience:
“So I think a lot of people may have chosen to use a video laryngoscope to
intubate [the patient], but I chose a little more still-used-but-less-commonly-used
technique of a fiberoptic intubation while the patient was still awake but sedated … and
that would not have been an incorrect decision, but it was one with more limited
secondary options. I may not have chosen the fiberoptic option if I was not very
comfortable doing that option. Because these days… the video laryngoscope has
cannibalized some of that experience [for others].”
Different domains also have different expectations that affect information
seeking. When P13 was probed regarding whether their close work with the surgical team
was unique, they responded:
“It's maybe a little bit of a broad generalization, but I would say cardiac
anesthesia has a little bit more of that [communication with the surgical team].”
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CHAPTER FOUR
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION OF VIGNETTE-BASED INTERVIEWS

All 18 participants took part in the vignette-based interview portion.
Transcriptions of the interviews were imported into an open source qualitative analysis
software package (Huang, 2016) for qualitative data analysis. Initial codes were created a
priori based on expected decision-making strategies revealed in the literature as well as
validating the vignette as a realistic scenario. Further codes were developed emergently
from the content of the interviews, with a focus on revealing deviations between
anesthesia provider decision making processes. An initial round of coding was
performed, the methodology and results of which were discussed with all members of the
research team in order to identify both potential oversights and new emergent themes,
which were then incorporated into a second round of coding.
Analysis of the data reveals two primary strategies that anesthesia providers
employ to manage the uncertainty/variability of a case: (1) Anesthesia providers seek
information from sources that are likely to inform anticipated problems and (2) anesthesia
providers seek to take preparatory actions in response to anticipated problems. While
these strategies are consistent with prior literature, the responses to these vignettes reveal
that there is variability in how different anesthesia providers employ these two strategies;
there is variability in what information different anesthesia providers prioritize seeking
and there is variability in what preparatory actions are performed. This variability has
implications on how we think about interventions and suggest design guidelines that
support a resilience engineering approach.
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Variability in Seeking Information to Inform Anticipated Problems
The notion that anesthesia providers manage the uncertainty of a case by
anticipating potential dangers, and the information seeking required to do so, has been
discussed in the prior literature summarized in the introduction above. The participant’s
responses to each prompt support that this approach is an accurate view of ‘work as
done.’ The variability in participant’s responses; however, suggest that, despite similar
applications of this approach, each participant has their own unique process for managing
a case. We were able to identify this process and the variability in its execution
throughout participants’ management of the case: first, before the case begins; second,
during standard maintenance; and third, as complication in the case arise.
Before the Case Begins
This approach is first revealed when participants were asked to provide their
medication plan for the hypothetical patient presented in prompt 1. Sixteen participants
described needing more information prior to coming up with a medication plan, as
described by P3:
“For a 13-year-old appy [appy is shorthand for appendectomy], it would depend,
first of all, if they are showing signs of basically what we call ruptured appy or bad appy,
where there is a lot of nausea, vomiting, possibly bowel obstruction, [perforated] bowel,
things like that. If so, then they are an aspiration risk. If they're an aspiration risk, then
you're looking at rapid sequence induction.
While several participants also prioritized the patient’s nausea and vomiting as
their main concern, other participants prioritized different information, as evident in their
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initial response to the prompt. P2 prioritized the expectations of the patient and parents:
“So again, this depends on my conversation with patient and parents, what their
expectations are.” P5 prioritized whether the patient had an IV in place: “So this patient it depends on whether this patient has an IV in place.” P15 alternatively prioritized the
patient’s demeanor: “Well, that depends on the kid. If the kid seems to be really cool, 13
years old, I would probably not give Midazolam. If the kid is in severe distress, I would
give some, depending on body size and how mature the kid appears to me.” Each
participant described a unique and variable process for how they navigate their concerns
while developing a medication plan for the patient. We continue to see variability in what
concerns participants prioritize, and thus what information they seek, as they continue to
manage the case.
During Standard Maintenance of the Case
In prompt 2, the participants were informed that the hypothetical case began
uneventfully and is now in process. At this point in a case, anesthesia providers are
generally in the process of performing “maintenance,” a process of incorporating
feedback from the monitors around them to successfully keep the patient asleep,
paralyzed, and pain free. When asked what they would do at this point, almost every
participant (16) describe a process of anticipating for things to wrong. Four participants,
P1, P2, P8, and P13, explicitly describe looking and preparing for the worst possible
events:
“In my head, I'm always thinking, even as an attending, okay, what's the worst
thing that could happen? What am I going to do if the endotracheal tube pops out? Or if
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he has bronchospasms? I always try to plan ahead of that and know where my plan ABC
is for all these things. […] I try not to just think that every patient - "Oh, every 13-yearold boy is the same" - but there are certain things you want to watch out for. So are they
going to need more drugs because they're a young patient? Are they going to react more
to surgery? […] And then again, I try to think of worst case scenarios like: What am I
going to do if he has a bronchospasm? Do I have like my gas appropriately turned up?
Do I have Precedex in case he wakes up uncontrollably later? So those would be things I
think about.” – P2
Several other participants do not explicitly express preparing for “the worst thing
that could happen,” but instead discuss various potential problems they would look out
for. For example, P14 describes being concerned about potential problems with the
instruments: “You said it's a well-placed tube but it could get pushed down. You know,
there's a lot of different things that can happen. The cuff could be not inflated all the
way and then the bellows on the ventilator would be dropping.” P3 describes anticipating
that the patient could be in pain:
“So for the duration of the case, [an anesthesia provider] typically kind of weens
down [their] vent settings throughout the case to see: one, are they going to be somebody
that's kind of breathing on their own early? Which … could be an indication of pain
under us, [the patient] not getting enough pain medication. […] The other thing
[anesthesia provider’s focus on] is getting the oxygen down, things of that nature to show
that [the patient is] not at some increased requirement. So for example, if we're all
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breathing 21% and the kid can't breath 30% on a ventilator without desatting, that
means something's going on with the kid.”
The most commonly mentioned event indicative of participants anticipating
potential danger is the special focus applied when insufflation occurs in the case,
described by P13:
“I'm looking for abnormalities. I'm looking for things that are unexpected. With
that particular case, also there's a crucial point when they insufflate the abdomen …
that's a really critical point in the operation where you want to be vigilant about a
sudden change. And so those would be that would be times when I would be particular not that I, not that you're not alert all the time, but there are certain benchmarks
during procedures where you want to pay particular attention and watch for certain
known complications from that maneuver.”
Even participants that curtly describe their process when asked what they would
do at this point in the case, such as P5 – “Really nothing, let the surgeon take the
appendix out,” and P10 – “Maintain sounds good to me,” further expand on their
concern at the point of insufflation:
[In response to “What do you do now?”] “Really nothing, let the surgeon take
the appendix out. And you know watch the watch the monitors, make sure you know
they're going to be insufflating the abdomen at this point if it's laparoscopic. […] So
anticipate what the surgical next surgical move is. So it's going to be insufflation of the
abdomen and with that can - comes up you know, some cardiac responses.” – P5
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“As they insufflate the abdomen there can be a vagal response, especially in
that age, actually. So that's just something that I look for as they're actually insufflating.
[…] And that's just something that you know, at that point in the surgery, I'm aware that
can happen. […] So that's kind of the next big portion of what I'm looking for.” – P10
Again, each participant described a unique process of what concerns they are
focused on while maintaining the patient, whether it be insufficient pain medications,
dangers during insufflation, or, as P10 describes, having “adequate muscle relaxant on
board - it just it gives us peace of mind that they're not going to move with a big metal
spike in their abdomen.” As complications in the case arise, we find variability in how
the participating anesthesia providers seek information as they start to anticipate new
potential problems.
As Complications in the Case Arise
As the hypothetical case progresses with prompt 3, participants are informed of
arising complications. Participants are first informed that the case has been going on for
45 minutes (long for a laparoscopic appendectomy) and that there is frustration growing
in the room, as can be seen on the surgeon’s face. As expected, participants want to know
more about the frustration as they start to anticipate potential problems, as described by
P6:
“I would need to know the source of the frustration to know what I would do
next. It could be inner personal frustration. It could be equipment frustration. It could be
frustration with the surgeon not being able to achieve his task. So I would really need to
know that because the therapies for that are different.”
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Participants already start to anticipate further complications and how they would
be addressed, such as the patient not having enough muscle relaxant, mentioned by P17:
“And the other thing that I might double check, if they're really struggling, is to make
sure that the patient had enough muscle relaxation cause when the surgeons are
struggling sometimes it has to do with exposure which you can optimize by giving more
muscle relaxant;” the surgeon needing to open the patient, mentioned by P11: “I mean, if
they open that's a different situation, obviously, then probably I would need more pain
medication, potentially a block at the end of the case;” and bleeding being an issue, as
described by P18:
“You know, and if I think that something is worrisome on their side of things,
whether you know they're losing blood, if it's something that's going awry that I might
need to change what I'm doing to assist with. So if they're losing a lot of blood, I need to
be on top of that and asking them ‘well what's going on, are you losing a lot of blood?’
And I have both [direct and] indirect ways of figuring that out. I hear the suction
canister, I can see the suction canister. I know what type of surgery we're doing, and
what's the risk of, you know, straightforward lap appendectomy, you're not gonna lose a
lot of blood, so it's probably not going to be a big concern. But I would be able to kind of
figure out indirectly, what's going on, or at least, you know, in that scenario.”
At this point in the case, the participants still describe using the same information
sources they use for standard maintenance: “Heart rate, vitals, again, oxygen saturation,
make sure that patient's ventilated. Make sure that everything that I'm doing was within
normal parameters” – P12. We also see the inclusion of other potential information
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sources in anticipation of potential problems, such as the suction canister mentioned by
P18 above. The greatest source of variability between participants at this point in the case
is whether they would choose to communicate with the surgeon as a source of
information. Six participants said that they would reach out to the surgeon seemingly
without hesitation:
“So communication, again is key. I ask, ‘Well, how can I help you? Is there
something you're missing? Do you need him to be more relaxed? Are you planning on
opening? Is there any change in the surgical plan?’ So I kind of try to understand why
they're getting frustrated.” – P2.
Six participants describe potentially reaching to the surgeon, depending on factors
such as their personal relationship with the surgeon:
“That depends on my personal relationship with the surgeon to be honest… So
if that would be a tension between the surgeon and me, I would probably shut up and just
watch it more closely, alerted. If the surgeon is kind of friendly and psychologically
healthy person… I would go "What's wrong? … Can I help you with something?" I would
address it that probably” – P15;
Or their concern for the patient’s safety:
“So, you know, if it gets to the point where you feel like something's unsafe, then
you might make the recommendation, ‘hey, is there somebody else that could [take over
the case]”… So that's one of those things, you just kind of ride it out unless, unless you
feel like it's becoming unsafe” – P14.
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Six participants describe not being inclined to reach out to the surgeon at all:
“You know, that's certainly not in my scope of my practice to, to even comment on or to
deal with. So I would probably not do anything. This frustration is a surgical problem”
– P5.
The distinction of whether the participant would or would not talk to the surgeon
shows a clear deviation in the information seeking process. We know from prior studies
that communicating with colleagues is a vital method of receiving cues (i.e., information
seeking) that inform accurate recognition and assessment of the situation (Fioratou et al.,
2016); however, here we see that anesthesia providers take different approaches to this
information seeking. Some participants would reach out to the surgeon and get
information directly, others may only reach out to the surgeon depending on their
relationship or concern for the patient’s safety, and others are not inclined to reach out to
the surgeon at all, instead only getting information via listening to the surgeon or have
otherwise determined that surgeon frustration is not pertinent to their responsibilities in
the case. Anesthesia providers that are not communicating with the surgeon could be
missing out on valuable information required to safely manage the case.
Participants’ responses to prompts 1 through 3 highlight the process anesthesia
providers use to manage uncertainty: anesthesia providers anticipate potential problems
and seek information to assess whether these potential problems will come to fruition. In
assessing the variability between anesthesia providers, we find that this process plays out
differently for each anesthesia provider. Participants responses indicate a variability in
what problems they anticipate and how they seek information to inform those problems.
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As the hypothetical case progresses past prompt 3, the participants are informed that their
anticipated problems have come to fruition – the surgeon needs to open the patient and
the surgeon is confronting a problem with bleeding. At this stage in the case, the
participant anesthesia providers are no longer just anticipating future problems; they are
taking preparatory actions in response to the problems in front of them. In addition to the
continued variability we see in information seeking and problem anticipation, we see
variability in what preparatory actions participants describe taking.
Variability in both Information Seeking and Taking Preparatory Actions in
Response to Anticipated Problems
Variability in Taking Preparatory Actions as the Case Changes to Open
In prompt 4 the participant is informed that the surgeon needs to open the patient.
At this stage in the case, the anesthesia provider shifts from solely anticipating potential
problems to addressing the problem confronting them. Every participant describes at least
one action that they would take in response to the surgeon needing to open, with the two
most common responses being (1) to manage the increase in pain expected by the
increased incision size, mentioned by 14 participants, and (2) to reassess and potentially
increase the paralytic to ensure the patient does not move as the surgeon gains access to
the appendix, mentioned by 10 participants. While the need for these actions to be taken
are expressed by most participants, how the participants would accomplish these tasks is
variable from participant to participant. While not every participant who mentioned
needing to manage the increase in pain described how they might do so, those that did
described doing so in various ways. These ways include simply increasing the amount of
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narcotics that were already being supplied to the patient, changing the narcotic, providing
non-narcotic analgesics, and using regional techniques. Quotes from participants
supporting each of these choices can be found in Table 1.
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Method of managing increase in pain

Applying more of the same narcotic

Example of supporting participant quotes
“And then I would probably also give a little bit more
analgesic, which would be Fentanyl cause it's more you
know, the opening's more stimulating than the
laparoscopic wounds that they've already made.” – P17
“So I probably preemptively give them probably some
fentanyl prior to them opening.” – P16
“Maybe switching from something short acting
Fentanyl to a Dilaudid which is longer acting which
can carry the patient into the PACU” – P12

Changing the narcotic

Providing non-narcotic analgesics

“And so up until that point, probably would have been
able to get away with the Fentanyl as the opioid, but in
this case, I'd probably started thinking about more of a
longer longer lasting opioid medication like Delaudid”
– P13
“So there's some other medications we can give like
precedex and ketamine to help with larger incisions.” –
P13
“Probably going to go ahead and give more of a
narcotic because it's going to be much more
stimulating. I may give that precedex. That's that other
medication we give to kind of decrease the amount of
narcotic but it helps with pain.” – P14
“So I'm thinking about titrating, narcotics and
appropriately or if I need to do other non-narcotic pain
medication.” – P18
“I would typically employ some kind of regional
technique as long as it's fine from the surgeon’s
perspective” – P3

Using regional techniques

“You could, again, if they're allowed to do some sort of
a block or something afterwards, you can alert the pain
team too as well.” – P11

“So if we convert from the laparoscopic procedure to
an open procedure, you know, we can do nerve blocks
to help out with that pain.” – P18
Table 1: Quotes from participants’ responses for managing the patient’s pain in various ways
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Another point of variability in how the participants manage the case at this point
arises in the whether or not the participant would take further preemptive actions to help
manage the case, such as adding a second IV line. Participants 5, 8, and 10 all mention
considering adding a second IV, and each come to a different conclusion. At this point in
the case P5 would not add a second IV: “it would not impact my management. I'm happy
still with one IV it's only an appendectomy”. P8 describes potentially adding a second IV
depending on the presence of other information: “So I might not necessarily put an IV or
[arterial] line in. But if all of the sudden I know they nicked something big and they're
losing [blood], then that's going to be the next step of getting a second IV” – P8. In
contrast to participants 5 and 8, P10 describes how they would always add a second IV at
this point in the case: “I always will just kind of get under one of the arms and start a
second IV. Just can't hurt. I mean, if you end up getting into a bloody situation, it's nice
to have a second IV for giving blood. So I would start a second IV.”
Variability in Information Seeking as the Case Changes to Open
While the information that the surgeon is going to open the patient serves as a
major cue in assessing the situation and implementing actions, it did not lead to a
complete recognition of the situation; most (10) participants felt that they needed to know
more about why the surgeon was opening in order to properly assess and act on the case,
such as P8: “It would depend on why do they think that we're opening? Is it just that it's
just a bad appendix? And they're going to have to wash out? Or did they get into some
bleeding and now we're having to worry about that?”
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We see different participants describe different approaches to seeking this
information. Similar to prompt 3, there is still a separation between those who would and
would not talk to the surgeon, however several participants who would not have talked to
the surgeon earlier would do so here, such as P7 who at this point would “communicate
with the surgery team.” P9 describes how they would initially try to understand the
surgeon’s reasoning for opening through visual inspection and would only communicate
with the surgeon if that did not answer their concern:
“If you can communicate with the surgeons, the big thing is like … what kind of
problems are you having? … If I can tell what's going on based on looking I try not to
interject, they're usually pretty good about like, [mentioning] if something's going
wrong. If it's because they can't get the damn thing in a bag … I don't ask them anything
like I can see that they can't get it in the bag. But yeah, communication, I guess.”
Some participants, like P5, describe a view of the surgeon’s process as separate
from the anesthesia provider’s process. While P5 does describe how they would have to
manage the increased pain response and check on paralytics, their responsibility goes no
further than patient safety and is not concerned with the surgeon’s troubles:
“Whether it's open or laparoscopic I still am responsible for patient
hemodynamics and stability. So whether [the surgeon] is opening up or whether [the
surgeon] is doing it laparoscopically, my focus is on the patient. The surgical field is
totally [the surgeon’s].”
This view is contrary to other participants who describe taking a much more
active role in communicating with the surgeon, like P2: “And if he is going to open I'd
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talk about ‘do you anticipate losing a lot of blood and like, what are the issues that you're
running into? Do you need him to be more relaxed? How can I help you?’ Essentially.”
Variability in Taking Preparatory Actions as Bleeding Becomes a Problem
In Prompt 5 the participant is informed that the surgeon begins to mumble about
some “damn bleeding,” suggesting that there is a problem with patient blood loss. Again,
participants take preparatory action in response to this information. Potential preparatory
actions include starting a second IV line, an arterial (A) line, and/or an external jugular
(EJ) line, supplementing fluids, sending off type and screen/cross labs, calling for extra
blood, and asking for help from other colleagues. While most every participant mentions
sending off labs, there is variability in which of the several other preparatory actions
participants mention, as seen in Table 2.

39

P
1
2
3
4

Send off
labs

Add a
second IV

•
•
•
•

Preparatory Actions Mentioned
Start an A- Start an EJ- Supplement
Line
Line
fluids

•

Call for
blood

Ask for
help

•
•

•
•

5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•

•
•

•
•

•
•

•
•
•

•
•

•
•
•

•
•

•
•
•
•

•

•

#

16
8
5
2
5
4
Table 2: Preparatory actions mentioned by each participant in response to prompt 5
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7

Variability in Information Seeking as Bleeding Becomes a Problem
Despite the many preparatory actions described, these are still only potential
actions; whether these actions would be taken is dependent on further information
seeking, as described by P2: “But again, a lot of [these potential actions] relies on
conversation with the surgeon, how [the patient’s] presenting on the vital signs,
ventilator, and otherwise.” All participants describe taking steps to learn more about the
status of the bleeding, either by reaching out to the surgeon, assessing the blood loss from
the field, and/or calculating the patient’s allowable blood loss. Seven participants, like
P16, begin this process by reaching out to the surgeon: “I would speak up and say, ‘Hey,
we got a problem down there?’ or ‘Are we having some bleeding?’” Eight other
participants, like P6, would first assess blood loss from the field: “Look at the field, see if
I can see the bleeding. Listen, see if the sucker is very active. Then you look for the
containers that the blood goes in where it's aspirated.… So you do your little blood
assessment.” Two participants, P13 and P17, begin by calculating the allowable blood
loss:
“So I'm going to run a quick calculation in my mind about how much blood loss
will be allowable until we would potentially be needing like a transfusion. And so once,
having done that calculation, that would sort of give me an idea of how much time I
have” – P13.
Table 3 shows the different information sources mentioned by participants, and in
what order those sources were mentioned. While these information sources are not
mutually exclusive (two participants, P13 and P16, mentioned using all of these
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information sources), the variability in what information sources are primarily used
highlight the different approaches that anesthesia providers may take to assess a
potentially dangerous emerging situation.
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Information Seeking Sources
P

Talk to Surgeon

1

1

2

1

3

1

2

2

1

6

1

7

1

8

1

9

1

2

10

1

11

1

12

1

13

Calculate allowable blood loss

1

4
5

Look/listen for blood loss

3

2

1

1

14
15

1

16

1

17

2

18

2

3

2
1

1

Table 3: Order of information seeking sources sought in response to prompt 5. The number
indicates whether the source was mentioned first, second, or third in the response.
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CHAPTER FIVE
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Understanding Anesthesia Provider ‘Work as Done’
These two-part interviews provide a functional context for understanding how
anesthesia providers perform ‘work as done.’ The modified critical decision method
interviews illuminated the complexity of the anesthesia domain: how variability and
uncertainty make patient safety challenging. Complexity can arise from cases that require
special anesthetic considerations such as robotic cases, cases with complications, or
obese patients (that have mobility and dosage complications). In addition to navigating
those complex cases, anesthesia providers also face unpredictable conditions; language
barriers, erroneous monitors, and missing patient history are just a few of the additional
challenges that anesthesia providers must manage. These challenges forced anesthesia
providers to adapt; they asked creative questions and used the resources around them to
find information pertinent to assuring the safest anesthesia experience they can provide.
The vignette-based interviews illuminated the strategies that anesthesia providers
use to stay resilient, and the variability within those strategies. Anesthesia providers were
constantly seeking information in anticipation of potential problems, looking for the
worst-case scenario and preparing for it to come to fruition. These are the strategies that
anesthesia providers employ to create a resilient system, one which “can adjust its
functioning before, during, or following events and thereby sustain required operations
under both expected and unexpected conditions (Fairbanks et al., 2014, p. 1). Inherent in

44

the operation of a resilient system is a variability that derives from the insufficience of
protocols and the willingness to adjust required to sustain safety. For anesthesia
providers, this variability means that information seeking, anticipating, and preparing is
performed differently for each anesthesia provider. Thus, our understanding of anesthesia
provider ‘work as done’ can be tied to our understanding of how anesthesia providers
create a resilient system. These interviews highlight why former design efforts have
failed. The complexity of the anesthesia work system requires that anesthesia providers
constantly adjust and adapt to keep patients safe; prescriptive guidelines and protocols
cannot account for this variability and thus anesthesia providers perform ‘workarounds,’
avoiding those interventions in order to continue their resilient management process.
Design Recommendations and Perspectives
Efforts to reduce medication errors or any harm in anesthesia should support, and
avoid hindering, the resilience of anesthesia providers whenever possible. Anesthesia
providers perform resilience by seeking out information in anticipation of things going
wrong. Thus, design efforts should focus on supporting anesthesia providers in two ways:
(1) supporting their ability to seek information and (2) supporting their ability to
anticipate things that could go wrong.
The interviews highlight several potential avenues for supporting information
seeking. P13’s response to the modified critical decision method interview indicates that
environmental factors can inhibit their ability to seek information, as ambient noise in the
OR made it difficult for P13 to hear the patient’s breathing. Designs efforts may want to
incorporate the ability to isolate clean information, and conversely avoid introducing new
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noise. In addition to helping anesthesia providers get clean information, design efforts
should also consider the timeliness and availability of information. Anesthesia providers
efforts to anticipate potential problems shows that timing of information is important, the
sooner the anesthesia provider is made aware of pertinent information, the faster they can
respond and act accordingly. Another design consideration identified in the vignette
interview data analysis stems from the anesthesia provider’s varying willingness to
communicate with the surgeon. While efforts to mediate personal relationships may fall
outside of an engineer’s capabilities, there are other avenues to address the lack of
information that may result in this circumstance. Smartly placed displays may be able to
provide the anesthesia provider with the surgeon’s perspective which could help the
anesthesia provider anticipate surgical problems without the need for direct
communication.
Additional considerations for supporting the resilience of anesthesia providers
may stem from the anticipatory component for anesthesia maintenance. Anesthesia
providers managed the hypothetical case by actively anticipating potential dangers. New
design efforts must be careful not to introduce potential dangers unfamiliar to anesthesia
providers, or it may inhibit their ability to anticipate and subsequently manage the new
uncertainty introduced. Conversely, new design efforts could focus on increasing
anesthesia provider’s ability to anticipate potential dangers, a possible avenue of which
could be encouraging anesthesia providers to share their resilient approaches/experiences
with their colleagues.

46

Additional design considerations stem from cases that require special anesthetic
considerations, such as robotic cases, cases with complications, or obese patients (that
have mobility and dosage complications), which may extend the considerations required
for effective information seeking and safe design. Involvement of other professionals
such as perfusionists or multiple anesthesia providers may also require adaptation. Future
interventions must consider the additional complexities inherent in these cases. Given the
variability of anesthesia provider ‘work as done,’ both in the cases that an anesthesia
provider is responsible for managing, and how anesthesia providers manage the same
case, one set of recommendations or design is unlikely to fit all scenarios.
The complexity of the anesthesia work system and the variability between
anesthesia providers identified in this work support the notion of a resilience engineering
approach to designing an intervention in this field – an approach where the differences in
how anesthesia providers manage a case are not inhibitive of the success of an
intervention, where interventions are devoid of forcing functions, allowing anesthesia
providers to continue using their own systems and strategies for success that they have
personally developed over years of experience and training.
Limitations and Future Work
Anesthesia providers were interviewed during breaks in their day and thus we had
a limited amount of time to interview them. As a result, we were not able to probe deeper
into the rationale behind the many decisions that the participating anesthesia providers
describe making throughout the interviews. These short interviews, in conjunction with
the limited demographic information we could provide in order to keep anonymity, made
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it difficult to assess why anesthesia providers described making one decision instead of
another. Additionally, interviews were only conducted in one hospital. Systematic
differences between hospitals may hinder the external validity of these results.
The vignette interviews presented the participants with a pediatric case, which
gave pause to the decision making of four participants that describe being unfamiliar with
pediatric work, such as P7: “I mean, I don't do pedes here at this institution. So that for
me is all you know, I probably wouldn't be doing that case.” However, two of those
participants reaffirm that a 13-year-old is of similar stature to many adults and thus are
unlikely to have any differences in their process, as mentioned by P12: “We don't really
do 13 year olds here anyways, but, at other facilities that I work we do and really, if he's
healthy, we're not gonna take any different steps really.” The vignette-based interviews
are vulnerable to the common methodological concerns for which vignettes have been
criticized for, including their structural validity, whether they appropriately simulate a
real-world scenario, and the subsequent external validity and generalizability of vignette
responses (Barter & Renold, 2000). While tacit decisions were likely omitted in many of
the participants’ responses, the information that the participants did share is likely
representative of their processes in a real-life scenario (Evans et al., 2015). Additionally,
there were instances where participants mentioned that the vignette provides a realistic
case that an anesthesia provider may encounter, such as how the surgeon mumbling about
bleeding is an accurate portrayal of a possible surgeon, mentioned by P2: “I do agree that
a lot of surgeons will kind of mumble and not tell you anything.” P7 provided a
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testimonial for the realism of the case as a whole: “I mean, really cases could go just like
that.”
Future work should further explore how anesthesia providers in other hospital
systems may further increase the variability in the decision-making process identified in
this work. Future work should also look at the medication administration process in
particular, as the hypothetical case presented in our vignette did not explore the decisionmaking process associated with medication administrations, instead it only focused on
medication determination and selection. Future work may also want to consider
additional applications of the vignette methodology, as it may serve fruitful in assessing
the ‘work as done’ anesthesia system and how new design efforts may interact with it.
Conclusion
Medication errors in anesthesia are prevalent and efforts to address medication
errors bring with them new potential avenues of failure, especially when the work system
and ‘work as done’ are not considered in the design of the intervention. We employed
two methodologies in interviews of anesthesia providers to help understand the context of
anesthesia ‘work as done’ to inform the design of future medication error-reducing
interventions. Results of the first interview methodology, the critical decision method,
revealed a diverse array of challenging scenarios in which ‘work as done’ often deviates
from ‘work as imagined.’ The different challenging situations were diverse, making it
difficult to generate emergent themes of similarities in how providers use information and
make decisions. The secondary set of interviews were conducted using vignette-based
interviews. Results of the vignette-based interviews revealed how the decision-making
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processes of anesthesia providers may vary even when managing an identical case. These
interviews highlight the potential unforeseen dangers that may occur with the addition of
future interventions and also suggest avenues in which future interventions may fit better
into the workflow of the anesthesia provider with design considerations. Future design
efforts should focus on supporting the resilience of anesthesia providers: the information
seeking and problem anticipation which are used to safely manage the uncertainty and
complexity of their work. Future work should assess how ‘work as done’ may vary in
different hospitals, and additionally focus on how ‘work as done’ influences the process
of medication administration.
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Appendix A
CDM and Vignette Interview Scripts
Introduction: Hello, my name is Josh. I’m here to study how anesthesia providers like
yourself make decisions. The interview will be split into two parts. For the first part, I’m
going to ask you to detail a case you worked on that was particularly challenging. For the
second part, I will describe a theoretical case to you and ask how you would manage the
case. I am audio recording this interview so I do not have to take notes. This interview is
anonymous, so please do not name specific individuals or use your name in your
responses.
Part 1 – Personal Account
Obtain Unstructured Account: Onto part 1. Please think about a case that you had
worked on that you found particularly challenging. A case where, in your opinion,
someone else might have made different decisions than you made. Or a case that, given
hindsight, you might wish to have made different decisions, such as choosing a different
medication or dosage. Once you have a case in mind, please describe this case and what
you did from start to finish.
(Participant response, take notes of key information)

Construct Incident Timeline: I am now going to repeat the case you shared based on
my understanding. The purpose of this is to identify “decision points,” basically the times
where you made your decisions. Please correct any errors that you identify with my
telling and fill in any gaps that you think I have missed.
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(Construction of timeline)
(Decision points identified)

Decision Point Probing: Now I am going to ask you some questions about some of the
decisions you made in the case you described. These questions are meant to illuminate
your reasoning and decision-making process. These questions are in no way meant to be
critical of the decisions you made.

Potential Probing Questions:
•

What did the preoperative assessment indicate about the case?

•

What information did you look for to guide that decision? Where did you look for
that information? What information led you to make the decision that you made?

•

Is there any other information which, if you had at the time, would have changed
your decision?

•

What barriers prevented you from making another decision (e.g. medication not
already prepared). If these barriers did not exist, would you have made a different
decision?

•

If you had the same case today, is there anything you would have do differently?

•

Is there anything else that you wish to say regarding this case?
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Part 2 – Pediatric Vignette Response
Introduction: Onto part 2. I will now describe an anesthesia case which you will
theoretically be participating in as your usual role as an anesthesia provider. I will then
ask you what you would do to manage the case. Please answer as truthfully as possible.
Again, this interview is anonymous, so please do not name specific individuals or use
your name in your responses.

Prompt 1: You’re approaching your third case of the day: an otherwise healthy 13-yearold boy is scheduled for a laparoscopic appendectomy. He is average height and weighs
45 kilograms. The case is occurring at your hospital and in the operating room that you
have the most experience with. You walk into the room and start preparing for the case.
You are standing next to the anesthesia machine at the head of the surgical table and you
stop briefly to take in your surroundings.
Questions 1:
•

Describe your environment. What do you see?

•

What is your medication plan for the patient?

•

What supplies and medications do you need?

•

How do you check to make sure you have everything you need?

Prompt 2: The case for the 13-year-old boy’s laparoscopic appendectomy begins.
Induction occurs uneventfully. Surgical prep and incision also occur uneventfully. In
place is a well-placed ETT and one well-functioning IV.
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Questions 2:
•

What do you do now?
o What information are you using where do you get it?
o What else are you thinking about and why?

Prompt 3: Though the case started uneventfully, it has now been 45 minutes. Frustration
is growing in the room.
Questions 3:
•

What do you do now?
o What information are you using where do you get it?
o What else are you thinking about and why?

•

Do you have any reason to question or rethink your medication plan?
o What information do you need to make this determination?

Prompt 4: The surgeon says “I have to open.”
Questions 4:
•

What do you do now?
o What information are you using where do you get it?
o What else are you thinking about and why?

•

Do you have any reason to question or rethink your medication plan?
o What info do you need to make this determination?
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Prompt 5: It has now been five minutes since the patient was opened. The surgeon
begins to mumble under their breath about some “damn bleeding.” Your gut is telling you
that something’s not quite right.
Questions 5:
•

What do you do now?
o What information are you using where do you get it?
o What else are you thinking about and why?

•

Do you have any reason to question or rethink your medication plan?
o What info do you need to make this determination?

•

Do you have any final thoughts on the case?
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